Multi-Unit Single Item Reverse Auctions:
Approximately- Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions
by Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri.
In Decision Support Systems 39, 2005, pages 105-121 (Special issue dedicated
to the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce).
The above paper presents an FPTAS for reverse auctions which you should
implement. This has been covered in the class.
Multi-Unit Single Item Forward Auctions:
Approximately- Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions
by Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, and Subhash Suri.
In Decision Support Systems 39, 2005, pages 105-121 (Special issue dedicated
to the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce).
The above paper presents an FPTAS for reverse auctions. You should develop
an FPTAS for forward auctions based on this and implement the same.
Multi-Unit Auctions modeled as a Nonconvex Knapsack Problem:
S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. Efficient Algorithms for Nonconvex Piecewise
Linear Knapsack Problems. Working Paper, ECL-CSA Technical Report,
Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of
Science, 2006.
This paper develops several algorithms. You are required to implement
the following: (a) Algorithm based on convex envelopes (b) 2-approximation
algorithm (c) FPTAS.
Branch and Bound Algorithm for Solving a Volume Discount Auction:
S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. A High Performance Branch and Bound Algorithm
for Solving Piecewise Linear Knapsack Problems. ECL-CSA Technical Report,
Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of
Science, 2006.
This paper proposes a branch and bound algorithm for solving the winner
determination problem of a volume discount auction. You are required
to implement this algorithm.
Discount Auctions for Combinatorial Procurement:
S. Kameshwaran, L. Benyousef, and Xiaolan Xie. Discount Auctions
for Procuring Heterogeneous Items. INRIA Research Report No. 6084,
December 2006.
This proposes two algorithms: BOS (Branch on Supply) and BOP (Branch on
Price) for solving the winner determination problem in volume discount
auctions arising in combinatorial procurement.
Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions:
Sandholm, T. 2002. Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial
Auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135, 1-54
This proposes an efficient tree based algorithm for winner determination which
you are required to implement.
Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions:
K. Leyton-Brown and Y. Shoham and M. Tennenboltz, An algorithm for
multi-unit combinatorial auctions, Proceedings of National Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, 2000 Paper-1 and Paper-2
This proposes an algorithm for optimal winner determination in multi-unit
multi-item auctions.
Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web:
Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, and Siva Sankar Reddy. Design of an Optimal
Mechanism for Sponsored Searrch Auctions. ECL-CSA Technical Report,
October 2006.
This proposes an optimal mechanism for keyword auctions on the web.
You are required to implement three mechanisms: GSP, VCG, and OPT
and compare their performance.
Iterative Combinatorial Exchange:
David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda, Sebastien
Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, and Hassan Sultan.
ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
In the Proc. 6th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), 2005
You are required to implement an iterative combinatorial exchange here.