Conference Publications

  • Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, and Y. Narahari.. To Test or Not: Incentivizing Individuals in a Population to Achieve Socially Optimal Testing in Epidemics. Proceedings of 16th International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE 2024), Bari, Italy.
  • Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, and Y. Narahari.  Inducing Socially Optimal Vaccination Behaviour through Vaccination Subsidies in Epidemics with Reinfection. Poster Presentation, ACM Conference on Computing and Sustainability, COMPASS 2024, New Delhi.
  • Amal Roy, Pranoy Das, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Chandramani Singh, and Y. Narahari. A Mean Field Game Approach to Promote Sustainable, Socially Optimal Behavior in Rational Individuals for Effective Management of Epidemics. Poster Presentation, ACM Conference on Computing and Sustainability, COMPASS 2023, Capetown, South Africa.
  • Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, and Yadati Narahari. Individual-Fair and Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2023), pages 2872-2874.
  • Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, and Y. Narahari. Designing Fair, Cost-optimal Auctions based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs through Farmer Collectives. To appear: Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE 2023), Auckland, New Zealand.
  • Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, and Y. Narahari. An innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. To appear: Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE 2023), Auckland, New Zealand.
  • Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Abhishek Chaudhary, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, and Y. Narahari. A Decision Support Tool for District Level Planning of Agricultural Crops for Maximizing Profits of Farmers. To appear: Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE 2023), Auckland, New Zealand.
  • Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan. Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. Proceedings of the International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE-2022). December 2022.
  • Rohit Patel,  Inavamsi Enaganti, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, and Y. Narahari. A Data-Driven, Farmer-Oriented Agricultural Crop Recommendation Engine. 10th International Conference on Big Data Analytics (BDA-2022), Hyderabad,  Lecture Notes in Computer Science, December 2022.
  • Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Azal Fatima, Inavamsi Enaganti, Yadati Narahari: Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Efficient Procurement of Agricultural Inputs for Farmers through Farmer Collectives. ACM Conference on Computing and Sustainability, COMPASS 2022: pp. 696-700.
  • Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan: Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2022). pp. 60-66.
  • Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Yadati Narahari: Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2022). pp. 489-495.
  • Shivika Naranag, Arpita Biswas, Y. Narahari. On achieving leximin fairness and stability in many-to-one matchings. AAMAS 2022: 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems.
  • Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari. Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. AAAI 2020, (34th  American Association for Artificial Intelligence) Conference on Artificial Intelligence),  5379-5386
  • Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari. Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits.  19th  International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems), AAMAS 2020: 1849-1851
  • Shivika Narang and Y. Narahari. A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. 19th  International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, AAMAS 2020: 1951-1953
  • Shivika Narang, Megha Byali, Pankaj Dayama, Vinayaka Pandit, Shivika Narang.   Design of Trusted B2B Market Platforms using Permissioned Blockchains and Game Theory, IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency. Seoul, May 2019. Pp. 385-393.
  • Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar, and Y. Narahari. Groupwise Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. Proceedings of AAAI-2018 (32nd AAAI (American Association for Artificial Intelligence) Conference on Artificial Inteligence,  New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, February 2-7, 2018, pp. 917-924.
  • Ganesh Ghalme,  Amleshwar Kumar, Sujit Gujar, Shweta Jain, and Y. Narahari. Design of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions for Online Discussion Forums. AAMAS-2018 (17th  International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems), Stockholm, Sweden, July 10-15, 2018, pp. 95-103.
  • Arpita Biswas, Siddharth Barman, Sanath, and Y. Narahari. Groupwise Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. Proceedings of AAAI-2018, 32nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, February 2-7, 2018, pp. 917-924.
  • Aritra Chatterjee, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Rohot Vaish, and Y. Narahari. Analysis of Thompson sampling for stochastic sleeping bandits. Proceedings of UAI – 2017, 33rd International Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. Sydney, Australia, August 2017, pp. 180-189.
  • Sneha Mondal, Swapnil Dhamal, and Y. Narahari. Two-phase influence maximization in social networkswith seed nodes and referral incentives. Proceedings of ICWSM – 2017, 11th International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media. Montreal, Canada, 2017, pp. 620-623.
  • Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, and Y. Narahari. Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. Proceedings of AAMAS 2017. 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Sao Paulo, Brazil. May 2017, pp. 642-650.
  • Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Thompson Sampling Based Mechanisms for Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. Proceedings of AAMAS 2017. 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Sao Paulo, Brazil. May 2017, pp. 87-95.
  • Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K J, Shirish Shevade and Y. Narahari. A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. Proceedings of AAMAS 2017. 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Sao Paulo, Brazil. May 2017, pp. 1667-1669.
  • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra and Narahari Y. On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. Proceedings of AAMAS 2017. 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems. Sao Paulo, Brazil. May 2017, pp. 42-50.
  • Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, and Y. Narahari. Optimal mechanism for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics. Montreal, Canada, December 2016, pp. 174-187.
  • Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Ajay Nagesh, and Y. Narahari. Wisdom of Students: A Consistent Automatic Short Answer Grading Technique. Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Natural Language Processing (ICON). 2016.
  • Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, and Y. Narahari. Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach. Proceedings of the Eurpean Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-16). August 2016, pp. 778-786.
  • Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, and Y. Narahari. Crowdsourced referral auctions. Proceedings of the Eurpean Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-16). August 2016, pp. 1654-1655.
  • Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari. Transfer learning for automatic short answer grading. Proceedings of the Eurpean Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI-16). August 2016, pp. 1622-1623
  • Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shrish K. Shevade, and Y. Narahari. A robust UCB scheme for active learning in regression from a strategic crowd. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Networks (IJCNN-2016). Vancouver, Canada, 2016, pp. 2212-2219.
  • Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shrish K. Shevade, and Y. Narahari. Topic model based multi-label classification. Proceedings of the 28th IEEE Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI-2016). San Jose, CA, USA, 2016, pp. 996-1003.
  • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Mishra, and Y. Narahari. Complexity of manipulation with incomplete information in voting. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-16). July 2016, pp. 229-235.
  • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Mishra, and Y. Narahari. Frugal bribery in voting. Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-16). Phoenix, Arizona, USA, February 2016, pp. 2466-2472.
  • Shweta Jain, Ganesh Ghalme, Satyanath Bhat, Sujit Gujar, and Y. Narahari. A deterministic multi armed bandit mechanism for crowdsourcing with logarthmic regret and immediate payments. Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Singapore, May 2016, pp. 86-94.
  • Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Sheta Jain, and Y. Narahari. A truthful mechanism with biparameter learning for online crowdsourcing. Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Singapore, May 2016, pp. 1385-86.
  • Palash Dey and Y. Narahari. Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election using Sampling. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2015), Brazil, 2015, pp. 1120-1126.
  • Rohith D. Vallam, Priyanka Bhat, Debmalya Mandal, and Y. Narahari. A Stackelberg game approach for incentivizing participation in online educational forums with heterogeneous student population. Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15). Austin, Texas, USA, pp. 1043-1049.
  • Praphul Chandra, Y. Narahari, Debmalya Mandal, Prasenjit Dey. Novel mechanisms for online crowdsourcing with unreliable, strategic agents. Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-15). Austin, Texas, USA, pp. 1256-1262.
  • Arpita Biswas, Shweta Jain, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari. A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 1101-1109.
  • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari. Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 87-96.
  • Palash Dey, Neeldhara Mishra, and Y. Narahari. Detecting possible manipulators in elections. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 1441-1450.
  • Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, and Y. Narahari. Profit maximizing prior free multi-unit procurement auctions with capacitated sellers. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 1753-1754.
  • Swapnil Dhamal, K.J. Prabuchandran, and Y. Narahari. A multi-phase approach for improving information diffusion in social networks. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 1787-1788.
  • Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari. An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 1789-1790.
  • Pankaj Dayama, B. Narayanaswamy, Dinesh Garg, and Y. Narahari. Truthful interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing applications. Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2015), Istanbul, May 4-8, 2015, pp. 1091-1099.
  • Shweta Jain, B. Narayanaswamy, and Y. Narahari. A Multiarmed Bandit Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Demand Response in Smart Grids. Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14). Quebec City, Canada, July 27-31, 2014.
    • Demand response is a critical part of renewable integration and energy cost reduction goals across the world. In this paper, we are motivated by the need to reduce costs arising from electricity shortage and renewable energy fluctuations. We propose a novel multiarmed bandit mechanism for demand response (MAB-MDR) which makes monetary offers to strategic consumers who have unknown response characteristics, to incetivize reduction in demand. The proposed mechanism incorporates realistic features of the demand response problem including time varying and quadratic cost function. The mechanism marries auctions, that allow users to report their preferences, with online algorithms, that allow distribution companies to learn user-specific parameters. We show that MAB-MDR is dominant strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and achieves sublinear regret. Such mechanisms can be effectively deployed in smart grids using new information and control architecture innovations and lead to welcome savings in energy costs.
  • Satyanath Bhat, Swaprava Nath, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, and Chris Dance. A Mechanism to Optimally Balance Cost and Quality of Labeling Tasks Outsourced to Strategic Agents. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2014), Paris, France, May 2014.
    • We consider an expert-sourcing problem where the owner of a task benefits from high quality opinions provided by experts. Execution of the task at an assured quality level in a cost effective manner becomes a mechanism design problem when the individual qualities are private information of the experts. The considered class of task execution problems falls into the category of interdependent values, where one cannot simultaneously achieve truthfulness and efficiency in the unrestricted setting due to an impossibility result. We propose a novel mechanism QUEST, that exploits the structure of our special class of problems and guarantees allocative efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, and strict budget balance. Our mechanism satisfies ex-post individual rationality for the experts and we also derive the weakest sufficient condition under which it is ex-post individual rationality for the center as well.
  • Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, and Y. Narahari. A Quality Assuring Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Incentive Compatible Learning. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2014), Paris, France, May 2014.
    • We develop a novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanism for the problem of selecting a subset of crowd workers to achieve an assured accuracy for each binary labelling tasks in a cost optimal way. This problem is challenging because workers have unknown qualities and strategic costs.
  • Palash Dey and Y. Narahari. Asymptotic Collusion-Proofness of Voting Rules: The Case of Large Number of Candidates. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2014), Paris, France, May 2014.
    • We study manipulability in elections when the number of candidates is large. Elections with a large number of voters have been studied in the literature and the focus of this paper is on studying election with a large number of candidates. Manipulability, when the number of candidates is large, is significant in the context of computational social choice. Our investigation in this paper covers the impartial culture (IC) assumption as well as a new culture of society which we call impartial scores culture (ISC) assumption, where all score vectors of the candidates are equally likely. Under the IC and ISC models, we study asymptotic collusion-proofness for plurality, veto, k-approval, and Borda voting rules. We provide bounds for the fraction of manipulable profiles when the number of candidates is large. Our results show that the size of the coalition and the tie-breaking rule play a crucial role in determining whether or not a voting rule satisfies asymptotic collusion-proofness.
  • Debmalya Mandal and Y. Narahari. A Novel Ex-Post Truthful Mechanism for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2014), Paris, France, May 2014.
    • There is currently intense interest in designing incentive compatible multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions (SSA). In this paper, we first prove two impossibility results which show that it is impossible to design an ex-post MAB allocation rule with sublinear regret when the click through rates (CTR) of the advertisements (ads) are affected by \emph{ad-dependent} externality or \emph{position-dependent externality}. The above impossibility results motivate our second contribution: when the CTRs are affected by only \emph{position-dependent} externality and follow \emph{click-precedence} property, we design an ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot SSAs.
  • Swapnil Dhamal and Y. Narahari. Scalable Preference Aggregation in Social Networks. Proceedings of the First AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing (HCOMP-2013), Palm Springs, California, USA, November 2013.
    • In social choice theory, preference aggregation refers to computing an aggregate preference over a set of alternatives given individual preferences of all the agents. In real-world scenarios, it may not be feasible to gather preferences from all the agents. Moreover, determining the aggregate preference is computationally intensive. In this paper, we show that the aggregate preference of the agents in a social network can be computed efficiently and with sufficient accuracy using preferences elicited from a small subset of critical nodes in the network. Our methodology uses a model developed based on real-world data obtained using a survey on human subjects, and exploits network structure and homophily of relationships. Our approach guarantees good performance for aggregation rules that satisfy a property which we call expected weak insensitivity. We demonstrate empirically that many practically relevant aggregation rules satisfy this property. We also show that two natural objective functions in this context satisfy certain properties, which makes our methodology attractive for scalable preference aggregation over large scale social networks. We conclude that our approach is superior to random polling while aggregating preferences related to individualistic metrics, whereas random polling is acceptable in the case of social metrics.
  • Rohith Vallam, C.A. Subramanian, Y. Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam, and Srinath Narasimha. Topologies of Stable Strategic Networks with Localized Payoffs. Proceedings of IEEE CASE-2013 (IEEE International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering), Wisconsin, Madison, August 2013.
    • There are numerous types of networks in the real-world which involve strategic actors: supply chain networks, logistics networks, company networks, and social networks. In this investigation, we explore the topologies of decentralized networks that will be formed by strategic actors who interact with one another. In particular, we analyze a network formation game in a strategic setting where payoffs of individuals depend only on their immediate neighbourhood. These localized payoffs incorporate the social capital emanating from bridging positions that nodes hold in the network.
  • Y.N. Chetan, Dilpreet Kaur, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Avik Sarkar, and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Power Cut Allocation in Smart Grids. Proceedings of IEEE CASE-2013 (IEEE International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering), Wisconsin, Madison, August 2013.
    • Smart grid technology envisages the use of strategic consumers. With demand for power outstripping supply in most countries, there is a critical need for an incentive compatible and efficient mechanism to allocate the inevitable power cuts across consumers. In this paper, we propose a reverse auction mechanism and a complementary forward auction mechanism that both are designed to allocate the power cuts. These auctions are based on redistribution mechanisms and satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility and allocative efficiency. We demonstrate the efficacy of these mechanisms for a typical scenario in the Indian power grid operations.
  • Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham, P Suresh, and S V Subrahmanya. Incentive Compatible Green Procurement Using Scoring Rules. Proceedings of IEEE CASE-2013 (IEEE International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering), Wisconsin, Madison, August 2013.
    • Green, or more generally, sustainable procurement is critical to any supply chain in the modern era. In this paper, we address the issue of selection of suppliers in order to ensure that the procurement process in a manufacturing or service supply chain minimizes carbon emissions. In this paper, an orchestrator or a procurement planner wishes to put together a green procurement network consisting of strategic suppliers. Our proposal decomposes the problem into two stages. In stage 1 (information elicitation), the orchestrator uses a green budget to offer appropriate incentives to the suppliers to report their carbon emissions accurately. This is done using an incentive design approach based on proper scoring rules. Having obtained emissions data in stage 1, the procurement planner identifies a pool of suppliers in stage 2(green supplier selection) to minimize the amount of carbon emissions of the overall procurement process.
  • Shweta Jain, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Y. Narahari, Saiful Husain, Voo Nyuk Yoong. Constrained Tatonnement for Distributed Demand Management in Smart Grids. Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Future energy systems, ACM e-energy 2013, Berkeley, California, May 2013. Pages 125-136
    • Growing fuel costs, environmental awareness, government directives, an aggressive push to deploy Electric Vehicles (EVs) (a single EV consumes the equivalent of 3 to 10 homes) have led to a severe strain on a grid already on the brink. Maintaining the stability of the grid requires automatic agent based control of these loads and rapid coordination between them. In this paper, we present a tâtonnement framework for resource allocation among intelligent agents in the smart grid, that non-trivially generalizes past work in this area. Our approach based on the work in server load balancing involves communicating carefully chosen, centrally verifiable constraints on the set of actions available to agents and cost functions, leading to distributed, incentive compatible protocols that converge in a constant number of iterations, independent of the number of users.
  • Ratul Ray, Rohith D. Vallam, and Y. Narahari. Eliciting Honest Feedback from Crowdsourced Tree Networks using Continuous Scoring Rules. To appear: Proceedings of AAMAS-2013 (12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems), Saint Paul, Minnesota, USA, May 2013.
    • Eliciting accurate information on any object using the wisdom of a crowd of individuals, utilizing web-based platforms such as social networks is an important and interesting problem. Peer prediction method is one of the known efforts in this direction but is limited to a single level. We non-trivially generalize the peer prediction mechanism to the setting of a tree network of participating nodes that gets formed when the query about the object originates at a root node and propagates to nodes in an underlying social network. We use proper scoring rules for continuous distributions and prove that honest reporting is a Nash Equilibrium. To compute payments, we explore the logarithmic, quadratic, and spherical scoring rules using techniques from complex analysis. Through detailed simulations, we obtain several insights regarding the relationship between the budget of the mechanism designer and the quality of answer generated at the root node.
  • Swapnil Dhamal and Y. Narahari. Forming networks of strategic agents with desired topologies. Proceedings of 8th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-2012), Liverpool, UK, December 2012.
    • Networks such as social networks play an important role in a variety of information diffusion tasks. The nodes in these networks correspond to individuals or customers who are self-interested. The topology of these networks often plays a crucial role in deciding the ease and speed with which certain tasks can be accomplished using these networks. Consequently, growing a stable network having a certain topology is of interest. Motivated by this, we study the following important problem: given a certain desired network topology, under what conditions would best response (link addition/deletion) strategies played by self-interested agents lead to formation of a pairwise stable network with only that topology. The investigation leads to interesting results for star graph, complete graph, bipartite Turan graph, and multiple stars with interconnected centers.
  • Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, and James Zou. Mechanism design for time critical and cost critical task execution via crowdsourcing. Proceedings of 8th Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE-2012), Liverpool, UK, December 2012.
    • An exciting application of crowdsourcing is to use social networks in complex task execution. This paper addresses the problem of a planner who needs to incentivize agents within a network in order to seek their help in executing a task as well as in recruiting other agents to execute the task. We study this mechanism design problem under two natural resource optimization settings: (1) cost critical tasks, where the planner’s goal is to minimize the total cost, and (2) time critical tasks, where the goal is to minimize the total time elapsed before the task is executed. We identify a set of desirable properties that should ideally be satisfied by such a crowdsourcing mechanism. In particular, sybil-proofness and collapse-proofness are two complementary properties in our desiderata. We prove that no mechanism can satisfy all the desirable properties simultaneously. This leads us naturally to explore approximate versions of the critical properties. We focus our attention on approximate sybil-proofness and our exploration leads to an interesting parametrized family of payment mechanisms which satisfy collapse-proofness.
  • Ramasuri Narayanam and Y. Narahari. A Game Theoretic, Decentralized, Local Information based Algorithm for Community Detection in Social Graphs Proceedings of International Conference on Pattern Recognition, ICPR-2012, Tsukuba Science City, Japan.
    • This paper uses a novel approach to detect communities in social networks. The approach is based on the notion of Nash stable partition of a graph and uses only local information available at each node in the graph. The algorithm outperforms most existing algorithms in the literature.
  • N. Viswanadham, Sridhar Chidananda, Y. Narahari, Pankaj Dayama. Electronification of agricultural mandis in India to optimize social welfare. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2012), Seoul, Korea, August 2012.
    • Agricultural mandis in India provide the interface between agricultural farmers and the market for the produce. Currently the agricultual mandis in India are middlemen-centric and unfriendly to the farmers. This paper advocates a promising electronic exchange approach to maximize the social welfare of all the stakeholders involved. Our approach leads to an interesting mixed integer programming formulation and a n auction approach that help maximize the total surplus while matching demand and supply as far as possible.
  • L. Udaya Lakshmi, Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham, Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, S.V. Subrahmanya, P. Suresh. A strategy-proof and budget-balanced mechanism for carbon footprint reduction by global companies. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2012), Seoul, Korea, August 2012.
    • The paper addresses the important issue faced by any green aware company to keep its emissions within a prescribed cap. The specific problem is to allocate carbon reductions to different divisions and supply chain partners in achieving a required target of reductions. The problem becomes challenging when the divisions and supply chain partners exhibit strategic behavior. We design a mechanism that satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility and strict budget balance and only suffers minimal loss of allocative efficiency.
  • Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, S.V. Subrahmanya, L. Udaya Lakshmi, N. Viswanadham. Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2012), Seoul, Korea, August 2012.
    • Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely carbon emissions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in explicitly taking into account carbon emissions in planning procurement auctions.
  • D. Premm Raj and Y. Narahari. Influence limitation in multi-campaign social networks: A Shapley value approach. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2012), Seoul, Korea, August 2012.
    • We investigate the problem of influence limitation in the presence of competing campaigns in a social network. Given a negative campaign which starts propagating from a specified source and a positive/counter campaign that is initiated, after a certain time delay, to limit the the influence or spread of misinformation by the negative campaign, we are interested in finding the top k influential nodes at which the positive campaign may be initiated. The influence function for the generic influence limitation problem is non-submodular. Restricted versions of the influence limitation problem, reported in the literature, assume submodularity of the influence function and do not capture the problem in a realistic setting. In this paper, we propose a novel Shapley value based approach for the influence limitation problem. Our approach works equally effectively for both submodular and non-submodular influence functions. Experiments on standard real world social network datasets reveal that the proposed approach outperforms existing heuristics in the literature. As a non-trivial extension, we also address the problem of influence limitation in the presence of multiple competing campaigns.
  • Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, and Y. Narahari. Optimal Incentive Timing Strategies for Product Marketing on Social Networks. Proceedings of AAMAS-2012 (Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems), Valencia, Spain June 4–8, 2012.
    • We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to potential buyers (influence) and b) referral rewards for customers who influence potential buyers to make the purchase (exploit connections). The problem is to determine the optimal timing of these programs over a finite time horizon. In contrast to algorithmic perspective popular in the literature, we take a mean-field approach and formulate the problem as a continuous-time deterministic optimal control problem. We show that the optimal strategy for the seller has a simple structure and can take both forms, namely, influence-and-exploit and exploit-and-influence. We also show that in some cases it may optimal for the seller to deploy incentive programs mostly for low degree nodes. We support our theoretical results through numerical studies and provide practical insights by analyzing various scenarios.
  • Swapnil Dhamal and Y. Narahari. Sufficient Conditions for Formation of a Network Topology by Self-interested Agents Proceedings of GTORA (Game Theory and Operations Research and Applications), Indian statistical Institute, Chennai, January 2012.
    • Existing literature on social network formation is concerned with predicting the topologies of networks formed assuming efficiency and stability. This paper addresses the reverse question: Given a desired topology, how do we form a network with that topology. The paper derives, for certain standard topologies such as complete network, star network, and k-bipartite network, sufficient conditions under which a sequential process of network formation leads to pairwise networks having those topologies.
  • Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, and Chris Dance. Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources. Proceedings of International Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-2011), Barcelona, Spain, pp. 539-546.
    • The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are observable by the controller, this problem is that of finding an optimal policy for a Markov decision process (MDP). When the states are held by strategic agents, the problem of an efficient task allocation extends beyond that of solving an MDP and becomes that of designing a mechanism. Motivated by this fact, we propose a general mechanism which decides on an allocation rule for the tasks and resources and a payment rule to incentivize agents’ participation and truthful reports. In contrast to related dynamic strategic control problems studied in recent literature, the problem studied here has interdependent values: the benefit of an allocation to the task owner is not simply a function of the characteristics of the task itself and the allocation, but also of the state of the resources. We introduce a dynamic extension of Mezzetti’s two phase mechanism for interdependent valuations. In this changed setting, the proposed dynamic mechanism is efficient, within period ex-post incentive compatible, and within period ex-post individually rational.
  • Mayur Mohite and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Application to Viral Marketing. Proceedings of International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS-2011), Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 1081-1082.
  • A. Radhika, Y. Narahari, Deepak Bagchi, P. Suresh, and S.V. Subrahmanya. Optimal Allocation of Carbon Credits to Emitting Agents. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2010), Toronto, August 22-24, 2010, pp. 275-280.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. An Iterative Auction Mechanism for Combinatorial Exchanges. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE-2010), Toronto, August 22-24, 2010, pp 849-854.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. Tatonnement Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (CEC-2010), Shanghai, China, November 2010, pp. 25-31.
  • K. Nagaraj and Y. Narahari. Threshold Behavior of Incentives in Social Networks. Proceedings of the 19th ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM), Toronto, Canada, October 2010, pp. 1461-1464.
  • Devansh Dikshit and Y. Narahari. Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks. Proceedings of WINE 2009 (Workshop on Internet and Network Economics), Rome, Italy. Stefano Leonardi (Editor), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-5929, pp. 386-397. December 2009.
    • Query incentive networks, proposed by Jon Kleinberg and Prabhakar Raghavan in 2005, capture the role of incentives in extracting information from decentralized information networks (such as social networks). Game theoretic models have been formulated and studied for characterizing the dependence of the monetary incentive required to extract the information on various factors such as the network structure, the level of difficulty of the query, required success probability, etc. Our contribution in this paper is to incorporate a practical and important factor, namely, quality of answers, in the monitization of query incentive networks. We propose truthful quality elicitation mechanisms by finding a connection to the brilliant, decades-old work on scoring rules by Nobel Laureate Richard Selten. We also investigate the budget balance properties of the proposed mechanisms.
  • Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. Proceedings of FAMAS 2009 (Formal Approaches to Multi-Agent Systems), Torino, Italy, September 2009.
    • There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. Our main result is an impossibility theorem which rules out linear rebate functions with non-zero efficiency in heterogeneous object assignment. Motivated by this theorem, we explore two approaches to get around this impossibility. In the first approach, we show that linear rebate functions with nonzero efficiency are possible when the valuations for the objects have some relationship. In the second approach, we show that rebate functions with non-zero efficiency are possible if linearity is relaxed.
  • T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. On the Incentive Compatible Core of a Procurement Network Formation game with Incomplete Information. Proceedings of FAMAS 2009 (Formal Approaches to Multi-Agent Systems), Torino, Italy, September 2009.
  • Sriram Somanchi, Chaitanya Nittala, and Y. Narahari. A Novel Bid Optimizer for Sponsored Search Auctions based on Cooperative Game Theory. Proceedings of IEEE/WIC/ACM Conference on Intelligent Agent Technologies, Milano, Italy, September 2009, pp. 435-438.
  • Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Kartik Subbian, and Y. Narahari. Nash Bargaining Based Ad Networks for Sponsored Search Auctions. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 170-175.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. Approximately Efficient Iterative Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 182-187.
  • N. Ramasuri and Y. Narahari. Stability and Efficiency of Social Networks with Strategic, Resource Constrained Nodes. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 188-193.
    • Recently, the topic of social network formation has received significant attention since the structure of the networks has a profound impact on the economic outcomes in many real world applications such as large exchange markets, sponsored search auctions, and viral marketing. Stability and efficiency are two important properties which are sought in such networks. These two properties are both desirable but not always compatible. This paper investigates the tradeoff between stability and efficiency in a noncooperative game model of social network formation. In our model, we consider network formation in which each node can form at most k links due to scarcity of the resources. We formulate the network formation process as a strategic form game.We view the notion of stability as obtaining a Nash equilibrium outcome and efficiency as maximizing the value of the network. In this setting, we show that all efficient networks are stable in both the cases: (i) k = 1 and (ii) k = 2.
  • Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commerce and Enterprise Computing (IEEE CEC-2009). Vienna, Austria, July 2009, pp. 74-81.
    • The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. We develop a procurement auction that minimizes the cost of procurement while satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. Under appropriate regularity conditions, this optimal auction also satisfies dominant strategy incentive compatibility. The results presented here hold true for equivalent forward auction settings as well.
  • Sujit Gujar and Y. Narahari. Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. 4th International Workshop On Internet And Network Economics (WINE), December, Shanghai, China, 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, pages: 438-445.
    • In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p) with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, individual rational- ity, and minimizing the budget imbalance. This calls for designing an appropriate rebate function. When the objects are identical, this prob- lem has earlier been solved by Moulin and Guo and Conitzer. However, it remains an open problem to design such a rebate function when the ob- jects are heterogeneous. We propose a mechanism, HETERO and conjec- ture that HETERO is individually rational and weakly budget balanced. We provide empirical evidence for our conjecture through experimental simulations.
  • Prashanth Bandaru and Y. Narahari. Efficient Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Volume Discounts Arising in Web Service Composition. Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE), Washington, DC, USA, August 2008, pages: 995-1000.
  • Ashwin Bellur, Y. Narahari, Shantanu Biswas. Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Business Clusters with Strategic Firms. Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE), Washington, DC, USA, August 2008, pages: 1001-1006.
  • Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Karthik Subbian, Y. Narahari. A Nash Bargaining Approach to Retention Enhancing Bid Optimization in Sponsored Search Auctions with Discrete Bids. Fourth Annual IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (IEEE CASE), Washington, DC, USA, August 2008, pages: 1007-1012.
  • N. Ramasuri and Y. Narahari. Determining Top K Nodes in Social Networks using the Shapley Value. Seventh International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, AAMAS-2008, Estoril, Portugal, May 2008, pages: 1509-1512.
    • In this paper, we consider the problem of selecting, for any given positive integer k, the top-k nodes in a social network, based on a certain measure appropriate for the social network. This problem is relevant in many settings such as analysis of co-authorship networks, diffusion of information, viral marketing, etc. However, in most situations, this problem turns out to be NP-hard. The existing approaches for solving this problem are based on approximation algorithms and assume that the objective function is sub-modular. In this paper, we propose a novel and intuitive algorithm based on the Shapley value, for efficiently computing an approximate solution to this problem. Our proposed algorithm does not use the sub-modularity of the underlying objective function and hence it is a general approach. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithm using a co-authorship data set from e-print arXiv (www.arxiv.org), having 8361 authors.
  • Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, M. Sudeep, P. Suresh, and S.V. Subrahmanya. An intelligent procurement marketplace for web services composition. Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM/WIC Conference on Web Intelligence, WI-07, Silicon Valley, November 2007, pages: 551-554.
  • Karthik Subbian, Ramakrishnan Kannan, Raghav Gautham, and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Group Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. Proceedings of the Asia Pacific Software Engineering Conference, Nagoya, Japan, December 3-5, 2007, pages: 270-277.
  • T. S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, CASE 2007, Scottsdale, Arizona, September 2007, pages: 664-669.
  • Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, M. Sudeep, P. Suresh, and S.V. Subrahmanya. A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services composition. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, CASE 2007, Scottsdale, Arizona, September 2007, pages: 716-721.
  • T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. The Core and Shapley Value Analysis for Cooperative Formation of Procurement Networks. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007, pp. 175-182.
  • Y. Narahari and Nikesh Kumar Srivastava. A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007. pp. 315-322.
  • D.Garg, Y. Narahari, and S.S. Reddy. Design of an Optimal Auction for Sponsored Search Auctions. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007, pp. 439-442.
  • Karthik Subbian and Y. Narahari. Truth Eliciting Mechanisms for Trouble Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Conference on Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, SEKE’2007, Boston, USA, July 2007, pages: 355-340.
  • Raghav Gautham, N. Hemachandra, Hastagiri, Y. Narahari. Optimal Auctions for Multi-Unit Procurement with Volume Discount Bids. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2007), Tokyo, Japan, July 2007, pp. 21-28.
  • N. Ramasuri and Y. Narahari. Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach. Proceedings of IEEE/Create-Net COMSWARE 2007, International Conference on COmmunication System softWAre and MiddlewaRE, Bangalore, January 2007.
  • S. Sivasankar Reddy and Y. Narahari. in advertisement Bidding Dynamics of Rational Advertisers in Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web. Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Control and Optimization of Dynamical Systems, ACODS-2007, Bangalore, February 2007.
  • Hastagiri Prakash and Y. Narahari. Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Resource Procurement in Computational Grids with Rational resource Providers. Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Control and Optimization of Dynamical Systems, ACODS-2007, Bangalore, February 2007.
  • Hastagiri Prakash and Y. Narahari. A Strategy Proof Auction Mechanism for Scheduling Grids with Selfish Entities. Proceedings of WEBIST 2006, Second International Conference on Web Information Systems, Setbal, Portugal, April 2006, pages: 178-183.
  • Y. Narahari and T.S. Chandrashekar. Optimal Design of Procurement Auctions. Proceedings of GM India Science Lab International Workshop on Frontiers of E-Business, December 9-10, 2005, Bangalore.
  • Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Earnest Foster, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, and Jeffrey D. Tew. A Groves Mechanism Approach to Decentralized Design of Supply Chains. IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce (IEEE CEC-2005), Munchen, Germany, July 2005, pages: 330-337.
  • Dinesh Garg, and Y. Narahari. Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete Information. First Workshop on Network and Internet Economics, WINE-2005, Hong Kong, December 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volumer 3828, pp. 1066-1075.
  • Dinesh Garg, and Y. Narahari. Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems. First Workshop on Network and Internet Economics, WINE-2005, Hong Kong, December 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volumer 3828, pp. 718-727.
  • T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. Economic Mechanisms for Shortest Path Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information. First Workshop on Network and Internet Economics, WINE-2005, Hong Kong, December 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volumer 3828, pp. 70-79.
  • S. Kameshwaran, and Y. Narahari. A Lagrangian Heuristic for Bid Evaluation in e-Procurement Auctions. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, (IEEE CASE 2005), Edmonton, Canada, August 2005, pages: 220-225.
  • Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, and Anish Das Sarma. A Decomposition Based Approach for Design of Supply Aggregation and Demand Aggregation Exchanges. Workshop on Theory Building and Formal Methods in Electronic/Mobile Commerce (TheFormEMC), October 2004, Toledo, Spain, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3236, Springer-Verlag, 2004, pp. 58-71.
  • Y. Narahari and Shantanu Biswas. An Iterative Auction Mechanism for Combinatorial Logistics Exchanges. The 9th International Symposium on Logistics. 11-14 July 2004.
  • Pankaj Dayama and Y. Narahari. Design of Multi-Unit Electronic Exchanges through Decomposition. Proceedings of the International Workshop on Manufacturing, Logistics, and Supply Chain Management, Bangalore, December 2003.
  • K.N. Rajanikanth, Y. Narahari, NNSSRK Prasad, and R.S. Rao. A Robust Software Architecture for Simulation of Airborne Radars, Proceedings of IEEE Region-10 Conference, TENCON-2003, Bangalore, October 2003, pp . 173-177.
  • K.N. Rajanikanth, Y. Narahari, NNSSRK Prasad, and R.S. Rao. Airborne Radar Data Processor Simulation Using Software-in-the-Loop Model. Proceedings of India Radar Symposium, IRSI-2003, 2003.
  • K.N. Rajanikanth, Y. Narahari, NNSSRK Prasad, and R.S. Rao. A Robust Design of Airborne Radar Simulation Software using Design Patterns, Proceedings of the National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, NCOOT-2003, Lonere, Maharashtra, August 2003.
  • D.Garg, Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham. Design of Six Sigma Supply Chains. Proceedings of ICRA-2003, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Taipei, Taiwan, October 2003,pp . 1737-1742.
  • D.Garg, Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham. A new approach to achieving sharp and timely deliveries in supply chain networks. Proceedings of IROS-2003, IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, Las Vegas, October 2003,pp . 2315-2320.
  • C.V.L. Raju, Y. Narahari, and K. Ravi Kumar. Reinforcement learning applications in dynamic pricing of retail markets. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce, CEC-2003, New Port Beach, California, June 2003, pp. 339-346.
  • S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. Trade Determination in Multi-attribute exchanges. Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Electronic Commerce, CEC-2003, New Port Beach, California, June 2003, pp. 173-180.
  • S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. E-procurement using goal programming. To appear in the Proceedings of EC-Web 2003, International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies, DEXA 2003 Conferences, Linz, Austria, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Volume 2738, Pages 6-15, 2003.
  • C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari, Reinforcement Learning Applications in Dynamic Pricing of Retail Markets. International Conference on Operations Research for Development. ICORD 2002, Chennai, December 27-30, 2002.
  • Pankaj Dayama and Y. Narahari, A Generalized Vickrey Auction with Reserve Prices for Efficient Electronic Trade. International Conference on Operations Research for Development. ICORD 2002, Chennai, December 27-30, 2002.
  • Y. Narahari, Maria Praveen Yatagiri, and Y. Ravi Shankar, IMPROVE: An innovative private marketplace for e-procurement. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.
  • C.V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Dynamic pricing of retail markets using reinforcement learning. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, A novel iterative reverse Dutch auction for combinatorial auctions. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.
  • D. Garg and Y. Narahari, Design of six sigma supply chains. First EuroAsia Workshop on I-Manufacturing and E-Commerce. Mumbai, December 2002.
  • Sourav Sen and Y. Narahari, Improving web server performance by network aware data buffering and caching. International Conference on High Performance Computing, HiPC 2002, Bangalore, December 2002, pp . 242-251.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, Iterative reverse dutch auction for electronic procurement. To be presented at the International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, ICECR-5, Montreal, Canada, December 2002.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, Supplier competition in electronic marketplaces. To be presented at the International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, ICECR-5, Montreal, Canada, December 2002.
  • S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari, A new approach to the design of electronic exchanges. To be presented at EC-Web 2002, International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies, Aix-en-Provence, France, September 2002, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 2455, pages 27-36, 2002.
  • C.V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Queueing network modeling and lead time compression of electronic procurement. Proceedings of ICRA-2002, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Washington, DC, USA, May 2002 ,pp . 763-768.
  • D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and N. Viswanadham, Achieving sharp deliveries in supply chains through variance pool allocation. Proceedings of ICRA-2002, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Washington, DC, USA, May 2002, pp. 2345-2350.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari, Analysis of supplier competition in electronic marketplaces. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.
  • D. Garg and Y. Narahari, A process capability indices based approach for supply chain performance analysis. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.
  • S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari, Innovative auction mechanisms for logistics marketplaces. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.
  • V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Use of reinforcement learning in iterative bundle auctions for procurement. Proceedings of the International Conference on Automation, Energy, and Information Technology, EAIT-2001, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, December 2001.
  • V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Effect of Internet Technologies on the Performance of the Procurement Process. Proceedings of All India Manufacturing, Design, and Research Conference, Chennai, December 2000.
  • Y. Narahari and S. Rajesh, Implementing Reverse Auctions and Double Auctions: An Experiment in Extending an Object Oriented Auction Package. Proceedings of: NCOOT-2000, National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, November 2000.
  • V.L. Raju and Y. Narahari, Effect of Internet Technologies on the Performance of the Procurement Process. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, June 2000. Also to appear in: Proceedings of All India Manufacturing, Design, and Research Conference, Chennai, December 2000.
  • Shantanu Biswas, S. Kameswaran, and Y. Narahari, Using combinatorial auctions in forecasting and production planning. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, June 2000. Also to appear in: Proceedings of All India Manufacturing, Design, and Research Conference, Chennai, December 2000.
  • Y. Narahari and S. Rajesh, Implementing Reverse Auctions and Double Auctions: An Experiment in Extending an Object Oriented Auction Package. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, August 2000. Submitted to: NCOOT-2000, National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, November 2000.
  • Y. Narahari, K.N. Rajanikanth, and Sourav Sen, WHAT: A Web-enabled Internet Auction House. Technical Report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, August 2000. Submitted to: NCOOT-2000, National Conference on Object Oriented Technology, November 2000.
  • Y. Narahari and S. Biswas. Supply Chain Management: Modeling and Decision Making. Invited paper. International Conference on Flexible Autonomous Manufacturing Systems, Coimbatore Institute of Technology, Coimbatore, January 2000
  • Y. Narahari, N. Viswanadham, and R. Bhattacharya, Design of synchronized supply chains: A six sigma tolerancing approach. Submitted to ICRA-2000, International Conference on Robotics and Automation, pp . 1151-1156.
  • S. Aithal, Y. Narahari, and E.S. Manjunath, Modeling, Analysis, and Acceleration of a Printed Circuit Board Fabrication Process. Proceedings of the International Conference on Operations Management for Global Economy, POMS-99, New Delhi, December 1999
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari. Object Oriented Modeling for Decision support in supply chain networks. Proceedings of the International Conference on Operations Management for Global Economy, POMS-99, New Delhi, December 1999
  • S. Aithal, Y. Narahari, and E.S. Manjunath, Modeling and Acceleration of a PCB Design Process. Proceedings of the Second Indian Operations Management Workshop, Bangalore, December 1998.
  • S. Biswas and Y. Narahari DESSCOM: Object Oriented Infrstructure for Decision support in supply chain networks. Proceedings of the Second Indian Operations Management Workshop, Bangalore, December 1998.
  • R. Sudarsan, Y. Narahari, K.W. Lyons, M.R. Duffey, and R.D. Sriram, Design for tolerance of electro-mechanical assemblies: An integrated approach. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA-98, Belgium, May 1998, pp . 1490-1497.
  • Y. Narahari, K.W. Lyons, and M.R. Duffey, Lead time modeling and acceleration of product realization processes. INFORMS Joint National Meeting, Dallas, Texas, October 1997.
  • Y. Narahari, R. Sudarsan, K.W. Lyons, M.R. Duffey, and R.D. Sriram, An integrated approach for design tolerancing of electro-mechanical assemblies. Proceedings of the Third Seminar on Assembly Modeling and Tolerancing, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, October 1997.
  • K. Ravikumar and Y. Narahari, Dynamic Scheduling of multiclass manufacturing systems with setups. Proceedings of the International Conference on Agile Manufacturing, Bangalore, February 1996, pp. 30-36.
  • N. Hemachandra and Y. Narahari, A linear programming approach to optimal scheduling in a stochastic manufacturing system. Proceedings of the International Conference on Agile Manufacturing, Bangalore, February 1996, pp. 22-29.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Hemachandra, Non-stationary models of manufacturing systems: Relevance and analysis. Proceedings of the 10th IEEE Intl Symposium on Intelligent Control, Monterey, California, USA, August 1995,pp . 298-303.
  • Y. Narahari, N. Hemachandra, and M. S. Gaur, Transient analysis of a multiclass production facility with priority scheduling. Proceedings of the SME International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Singapore, June 1995, pp. 654-661.
  • Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan, and S. Sridhar, Modeling the Effect of Hot Lots in Semiconductor Manufacturing Systems. Proceedings of the SME International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Singapore, June 1995, pp. 671-678.
  • Y. Narahari and L. M. Khan, Modeling re-entrant manufacturing systems with inspections. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Nagoya, Japan, May 1995, pp. 1738-1743.
  • Y. Narahari and R. Srigopal, A hybrid scheduling algorithm for multiclass production systems with setup times. Proceedings of the Rensselaer’s Fourth International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing and Automation Technology, Troy, New York, USA, August 1994.
  • Y. Narahari and R. Srigopal, A Lagrangian relaxation based scheduling algorithm for a flexible manufacturing system. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacture, Coimbatore, August 1994.
  • Y. Narahari and V. Sastry, Performance of a Brownian scheduling policy in a multiclass make-to-stock manufacturing system. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacture, Coimbatore, August 1994.
  • M. S. Gaur and Y. Narahari, Transient analysis of a flexible manufacturing system with centralised material handling. Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Computer Aided Design and Computer Aided Manufacture, Coimbatore, August 1994.
  • Y. Narahari and Sundar Ram Vedula, Real-world extensions to a production scheduling algorithm based on Lagrangian relaxation. Proceedings of 1994 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, San Diego, California, USA, May 1994, Volume 4, pp. 3167-3172.
  • Y. Narahari, Analysis of distributed scheduling policies in re-entrant lines. Proceedings of the NSF Workshop on Hierarchical Control for Real-Time Scheduling of Manufacturing Systems, Lincoln, New Hampshire, USA, October 1992.
  • C. R. M. Sundaram and Y. Narahari, Modelling and analysis of time variance of parallelism in parallel computations. Proceedings of IEEE TENCON’91, Sixth IEEE Region-10 Conference, New Delhi, India, August 1991.
  • N. Viswanadham, T. L. Johnson, and Y. Narahari, Performance analysis of automated manufacturing systems with blocking and deadlock. Proceedings of Rensselaer’s Second International Conference on Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Troy, New York, USA, May 1990, pp . 64-68.
  • N. Viswanadham and Y. Narahari, Analytical modelling of flexible manufacturing systems. Proceedings of the Symposium on Advanced Remote Handling Systems and Automation in Nuclear Installations, Bombay, India, March 1990, pp. 279-284.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Performance models of local area network protocols. In: Systems and Signal Processing. Proceedings of the Indo-US Workshop on Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, January 1988, Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi, India, 1990.
  • N. Viswanadham and Y. Narahari, Performance models of integrated manufacturing systems, In: Systems and Signal Processing. Proceedings of the Indo-US Workshop on Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, January 1988, Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi, India, 1990.
  • Y. Narahari, K. Suriyanarayanan, and N. V. Subba Reddy, Discrete event simulation of distributed systems using stochastic Petri nets. Proceedings of TENCON’89, Fourth IEEE Region-10 Conference, Bombay, India, November 1989, pp. 622-625.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Performance evaluation of computer systems using Petri nets with deterministic and stochastic timed transitions. Proceedings of IEEE TENCON’87, Third IEEE Region-10 Conference, Seoul, South Korea, August 1987.
  • N. Viswanadham and Y. Narahari, Coloured Petri net models for automated manufacturing systems. Proceedings of the 1987 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, San Diego, California, USA, March 1987, pp. 1985–1990.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Performance modelling of local area distributed systems using stochastic Petri nets. Proceedings of the Platinum Jubilee Conference on Systems and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1986, pp. 304–308.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Coloured Petri net models of generalized manufacturing systems. Proceedings of the Seventh European Workshop on Applications and Theory of Petri Nets, Oxford, England, July 1986, pp. 243–263.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, A Petri net-based investigation of deadlocks in automated manufacturing systems. In: CAD/CAM/CAE for Industial Progress, Edited by V. Rajaraman, North-Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1986, pp. 119–131.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Analysis and synthesis of flexible manufacturing systems using Petri nets. Proceedings of the First ORSA/TIMS Special Interest Conference on Flexible Manufacturing Systems: Models and Methods, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, August 1984.
  • Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, An efficient methodology for computation of place invariants in Petri nets. Proceedings of the National Systems Conference, Bombay, India, 1984.
  • Y. Narahari and M. Kamath, Modelling and analysis of manufacturing systems by Petri nets. Award Winning Paper in the IEEE India Student Paper Contest, 1984.