- Durgesh Kumar Verma, Y. Narahari, N. Hemachandra, Jeffrey D. Tew. Winner Determination in Bi-Objective Multi-Unit Procurement Auctions with Volume Discount Bids and Lead Time Constraints. Book Chapter in: Multi-Critera and Game Theory Applications in Manufacturing and Logistics , Lyes Benyoucef, Jean-Claude Hennet, and Manoj Kumar Tiwari (Editors). Springer. 2013, pp. 305-334.
- T.S. Chandrashekar and Y. Narahari. Procurement Network Formation: A Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach. Book Chapter in: Multi-Critera and Game Theory Applications in Manufacturing and Logistics , Lyes Benyoucef, Jean-Claude Hennet, and Manoj Kumar Tiwari (Editors). Springer. 2013, pp. 389-429.
- Deepak Bagchi, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Y. Narahari, Shantanu Biswas, P. Suresh, S.V. Subrahmanya, N. Viswanadham. Design of mechanisms for carbon emission reduction in global companies with strategic divisions and partners. Book Chapter in: Mechanism Design for Sustainability: Techniques and Cases , Zongwei Luo (Editor). Springer. 2013, pp. 37-60.
The problem addressed in this work is concerned with an important challenge faced by any green aware global company to keep its emissions within a prescribed cap. The specific problem is to allocate carbon reductions to its different divisions and supply chain partners in achieving a required target of reductions in its carbon reduction program. The problem becomes a challenging one since the divisions and supply chain partners, being autonomous, could exhibit strategic behavior. We model strategic behavior of the divisions and partners using a game theoretic approach leading to a mechanism design approach to solve this problem. While designing a mechanism for the emission reduction allocation problem, the key properties that need to be satisfied are dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), strict budget balance (SBB), and allocative efficiency (AE). Mechanism design theory has shown that it is not possible to achieve the above three properties simultaneously. We propose two solutions to the problem satisfying DSIC and AE: (1) a reverse auction protocol and (2) a forward auction protocol, while striving to keep the budget imbalance as low as possible. We compare the performance of the two protocols using a stylized, representative case study.
- Nageswara S.V. Rao, Y. Narahari, C.E. Veni Madhavan, David K.Y. Yau, and Chris Y.T. Ma. An Analytical Framework for Cyber-Physical Networks. Invited Book Chapter in: Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Infrastructure: Foundations and Challenges., Edited by Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant, and Nan Zhang. Elsevier Publishers. pp. 51-69, 2011.
Detection, identification, and tracking of spatial phenomena has become an important task in many environmental and infrastructure applications. We propose a cyber-physical network framework consisting of sensors and computational modules connected over a communication network, to address a generic class of problems involving spatial-dispersion sources.
- D. Garg, Y. Narahari, E. Foster, D. Kulkarni, and J.D. Tew. A Mechanism Design Approach to Supply Chain Formation. In: Planning Production and Inventories in the Extended Enterprise: A State-of-the-Art Handbook. (Series: International series in Operations Research and Management Science). Karl Kempf, Pinar Keskinocak, and Reha Uzsoy (Editors). Springer, 2011, pp. 153-184.
In this chapter, we describe a category of supply chain formation problems where the supply chain planner or the central design authority (CDA) is faced with the decision of choosing a partner or service provider for each supply chain stage so as to meet delivery targets and schedules at minimum cost. We first look into the case where the CDA has access to all the relevant information required to solve this problem. Such a supply chain formation problem with complete information becomes a plain optimization problem in a centralized framework. Since it is quite impractical for the CDA to have access to all the information, we next consider the incomplete information case. In this setting, the individual managers of the supply chain stages are not loyal to the CDA but are rational, intelligent, and autonomous entities always pursuing maximization of their individual payoffs and not necessarily revealing their true private values. The supply chain formation problem now becomes a mechanism design problem followed by an optimization problem. Our specific contribution is to show that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a natural and compelling model for such problems. We propose a decentralized framework to solve the underlying mechanism design problem. We illustrate our approach with the help of an example of forming a three stage distribution process for a typical automotive supply chain.
- T.S. Chandrashekar, Y. Narahari. Procurement Network Formation: A Cooperative Game Approach. In: Planning Production and Inventories in the Extended Enterprise: A State-of-the-Art Handbook. (Series: International series in Operations Research and Management Science). Karl Kempf, Pinar Keskinocak, and Reha Uzsoy (Editors). Springer, 2011, pp. 185-206.
In this chapter, we are interested in a procurement network formation problem. We present a case for modeling the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game. We investigate recent results in shortest path cooperative games and their implications to the procurement network formation problem. We then enhance the model for procurement network formation by incorporating asymmetry in the information that agents have. Specifically we model the procurement network formation problem as a shortest path cooperative game with incomplete information. We point out the incentive compatible core as an appropriate solution concept for this category of games. We then review the current state of the art on the topic of incentive compatible core, pose a conjecture and end with some directions for future work
- Y. Narahari and Sujit Gujar. Auctions in Electronic Commerce. Invited Book Chapter in: The Handbook of Technology Management, John Wiley and Sons, Volume 3, pp. 612-625, 2009.
In the recent times, the use of auctions in electronic commerce and electronic business applications has been growing dramatically. This chapter provides a glimpse of different types of auctions which could be deployed in high-tech e-commerce and e-business applications. The chapter describes three applications in detail: spectrum auctions for allocating radio spectrum licenses, procurement auctions which could be used in strategic sourcing, and sponsored search auctions on the web. The chapter also describes key game theory issues in the design of auctions and presents certain common challenges in their deployment.
- Y. Narahari and Ramasuri Narayanam. Game Theory. Invited Book Chapter: The Handbook of Technology Management, John Wiley and Sons, Volume 1, pp. 68-80, 2009.
Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool to study conflict and cooperation when multiple rational and intelligent decision makers interact. In this chapter, we introduce some key notions in game theory and explain their significance in strategic decision making, using illustrative examples. The notions we discuss are: strategic form games, dominant strategy equilibria, Nash equilibrium, two-person Nash bargaining problem, cooperative games, the core, and the Shapley value.
- Y. Narahari and S. Biswas Performance Measures and Performance Models for Supply Chain Decision making. In: Mesauring Supply Chain Performance, ICFAI (Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India) University Book Series, 2007.
Numerous models, algorithms, and tools have been deployed in supply chain modeling and decision making. These are based on stochastic models, optimization models, object oriented models, and simulation. This paper provides an expository introduction to decisions, performance measures, mathematical models, and software models in supply chain networks.
- Y. Narahari. Contributions to Electronic Commerce. In: Annals of Indian National Academy of Engineering, Volume II, December 2005, pp. 66-71.
This article describes some research contributions to electronic commerce arising out of our work during 2000-2004 at the Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore.
- Y. Narahari, Design of Secure Electronic Marketplaces. Book Chapter in: Information and Network Security, Indian National Academy of Engineering, 2002.
This is a chapter in a volume on the topic “Information and Network Security” brought out by the Indian National Academy of Engineering. The chapter provides an overview of issues of information and network security encountered in e-business marketplaces. The emphasis is on designing robust, cheat-proof mechanisms in single seller, multiple buyer (forward) auctions; single buyer, multiple seller (reverse) auctions; and multiple seller, multiple buyer exchange markets.
- Y. Narahari, Internet Technologies for E-Logistics and Relevance for India’s Surface Transportation. Book Chapter in: National Connectivity Vision: Surface Transportation and Communication, Indian National Academy of Engineering, 2001.
Logistics is a primary building block of any manufacturing or service supply chain. The term e-logistics refers to management of logistical resources using network and Internet technology. The article brings out common problems in surface transportation in the Indian context and shows that most of these problems could be tackled effectively by innovatively using Internet technologies. This is demonstrated through the use of Internet auctions in two key problems in logistics: (1) yield management in surface transportation (2) logistics marketplaces.
- N. Viswanadham, Y. Narahari, and N.S. Raghavan, Performance Analysis of Manufacturing Systems: A Business Process Approach. In: Group Technology and Cellular Manufacturing: A State-of-the-Art Synthesis of Research and Practice, N. Suresh and J. M. Kay (Editors), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
This paper proposes that re-entrant lines are quite congenial for modeling any business process. Two examples are explored in detail: a supply chain process and a new product development process. The major insight obtained in both cases is that intricate scheduling insights can be revealed by the models.
- C. R. M. Sundaram and Y. Narahari, Analysis of dynamic load balancing strategies using a combination of stochastic Petri nets and queueing networks. Advances in Petri Nets-1993, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 591, 1993, pp.397-414.
The notion of combining the best features of product form queueing networks and stochastic Petri nets in performance modeling was explored in this paper in the context of analysis of load balancing strategies in parallel and distributed computing systems. This proved to be quite a compelling application for this integrated approach.
- N. Viswanadham, Y. Narahari, and R. Ram, Performability of automated manufacturing systems. Book Chapter in: Manufacturing and Automation Systems: Techniques and Technologies: Control and Dynamic Systems: Volume 47, edited by C. T. Leondes, Academic Press, 1991, pp. 77–120.
Performability combines the notions of performance and reliability. The notion of performability is an extensively researched topic in the fault-tolerant computing literature. This paper examines the implications of performability for manufacturing systems. All first principles and principal concepts of performability are now cast in the manufacturing systems framework. This paper inspired a good deal of further research on this topic within the manufacturing systems modeling community.
- Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, Petri nets for modeling, analysis, and performance evaluation of flexible manufacturing systems. Systems and Control Encyclopedia, Supplementary Volume 1, Pergamon Press, 1990, pp. 279–283.
A popular treatment of use of Petri net models for qualitative and quantitative modeling of flexible manufacturing systems.
- Y. Narahari and N. Viswanadham, On the invariants of colored Petri net models. Advances in Petri Nets-1985, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 222, Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp. 330–345.
This generalizes the results of the above paper to that of coloured Petri nets. Once we realized that we will have to deal with linear functions rather than real numbers, the result was obvious.