Analytics with Strategic Users

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DECEMBER 19, 2011



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Thanks to Collaborators



Optimal Auctions for Direct Procurement



Combinatorial Auctions for Indirect Materials Procurement




Algorithms for Carbon Trading


Incentive Compatible Machine Learning Mechanism Design For Services



A Mechanism Design Problem








Sponsored Search Auction


Advertisers




Major money spinner for all search engines and web portals




Influence Maximization/Minimization







Location Based Crowdsourcing





<u>A Challenging Current Problem:</u> Incentive Compatible Learning

How do we ensure that the data provided by the users is accurate and truthful?

How do we do inference in dynamic settings when the parameters of the problem are held by strategic agents?

This calls for a marriage between game theory, mechanism design and machine learning and offers an exciting collaboration opportunity



Another Challenging Immediate Problem



RESEARCH COLLABORATION EXCHANGE

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Researchers from academia, labs, industry

Researchers from academia, labs, industry



