IISc IISc-Intel Resource Center on e-Business Market Algorithms Intel
Mechanism Design

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  • Yuko Sakurai Makoto Yokoo and Sigeo Matsubara. The effect of false-name declarations in mechanism design: Towards collective devision making on the internet. In Proceedings of International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS-2000), number 20, page 146, 2000.
LITEC Intel Laboratory for Internet Technologies and E-Commerce
Department of Computer Science and Automation
Indian Institute of Science 		CSA