e-Procurement

Craig Boutlier, Yoav Shoham, and Micheal P Wellman. Economic principles of multi agent systems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence, 94(1-2):1-6, July 1997. S. Kameshwaran and Y. Narahari. E-procurement using goal programming. In Proceedings of International Conference on Electronic Commerce and Web Technologies, DEXA 2003 Conferences, Linz, Austria, 2003. Gail Hohner, John Rich, Ed Ng, Grant Reid, Andrew J Davenport, Jayant R Kalagnanam, Soo Ho Lee, and Chae An. Combinatorial and quantity discount procurement auctions provide benefits to mars, incorporated and to its suppliers. INTERFACES, 33(1):23-35, 2003. Marta Eso, Soumyadip Ghosh, Jayant R Kalagnanam, and Laszlo Ladanyi. Bid evaluation in procurement auctions with piece wise linear supply curves. Technical Report RC22219 (W0110-087), IBM, 2001. Elmaghraby Wedad and Keskinocak Pinar. Combinatorial auctions in procurement. Technical report, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2002. Shantanu Biswas and Narahari Y. Iterative reverse dutch auction for electronic procurement. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Commerce Research, ICECR-5, Montreal, Canada, 2002. Kumar Manoj and Stuart I Feldman. Internet auctions. In Proceedings of Third Usenix Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1999. J.H. Kagel. Auctions: A survey of experimental research. In The Handbook of Experimental Economics, pages 501-587. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995. M. Herschlag and R. Zwick. Internet auctions-a popular and professional literature review. Electronic Commerce, 1(2):161-186, 2000. Paul Klemperer. Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of Economic Surveys, pages 227-286, 1999. Y K Che. Design competition through multi-dimensional auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 24:668-680, 1993. J Collins, W Ketter, and M Gini. A multi agent negotiation teatbed for contracting tasks with temporal and precedence constraints. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 7(1):35-57, 2002. Sven. de Vries and Rakesh V Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. Informs Journal on Computing, 2002. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behaviour, 35:166-196, 2001. Robert B Myerson. Optimal auuction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981. Tuomas W Sandholm. Agents in electronic commerce: Component technologies for automated negotiation and coalition formation. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 3(1):73-96, 2000. Robert B Myerson and Mark A Satterthwaite. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic Theory, 28:265-283, 1983. M Bichler, G Kersten, and S Strecker. Towards a structured design of electronic negotiations. Group Decisions and Negotiations, 12(4):311-335, 2003. Carrie Beam and Arie Segev. Automated negotiations: A survey of the state of the arti. Wirtschaftsinformatik, 39(3):263-268, 1997. Ravindra K Ahuja and James B Orlin. Inverse optimization. Operations Research, 49(5):771-783, 2001. David A Chappel et al. ebXML Foundations. Wrox Press, 2002. Albert Hirschman. Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1970. Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994. J. Oliver. A machine learning approach to automated negotiation and prospects for electronic commerce, 1997. Andreu Mas-Collel, Micheal D Whinston, and Jerry R Green. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995. Susan Helper and Paul J MacDuffie. E-volving the auto industry: E-business effects on consumer and supplier relationships. In Tracking a Transformation: E-Commerce and the Terms of Competition in Industries. Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 2000. Susan Helper and Paul J MacDuffie. B2b and modes of exchange: Evolutionary and transformative effects. In Bruce Kogut, editor, The Global Internet Economy. XXX Publishers, 2002. Andrew Davenport and Jayant Kalagnanam. Price negotiations for procurement of direct inputs. In Brenda Dietrich and Rakesh Vohra, editors, Mathematics of the Internet: E-Auction and Markets. Springer Verlag, 2001. IMA Volumes in Mathematics and its Applications. Craig Boutlier and Holger Hoos. Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 17th INternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2001. M Bichler, M Kaukal, and A Segev. Multi-attribute auctions for electronic procurement. In Proceedings of the First IBM IAC Workshop on Internet Based Negotiation Tchnologies, Torktown Heights, NY, USA, 1999. M Bichler, J Lee, H S Lee, and J Y Chung. Absolute: An intelligent decision making framework for e-sourcing. In Proceedings of the Third Workshop on ELectronic Commerce and Web Based Information Systems, San Jose, CA, 2001. M Bichler and H Werthner. Simulation of multidimensional procurement auctions. In Proceedings of the European Simulation Multi-Conference, Gent, Belgium, 2000. Martin Bichler, Jayant Kalagnanam, and Ho Soo Lee. Reco: Representation and evaluation of configurable offers. Technical report, IBM Research Report, RC 22288, 2002. R. Keeney and H. Raiffa. Decisions with multiple objectives: Preferences and value tradeoffs. Wiley, 1976. Ralph E Steur. Multiple Criteria Optimization: Theory, Computation and Application. Wiley, 1986. Lyes Benyoucef, Hongwei Ding, and Xiaolan Xie. Supplier selection problem: Selection criteria and methods. Technical report, INRIA, Lorraine, 2003. 205,1 Tim A Minahan, Howarth Francis, and Vigoroso Mark. Making e-sourcing strategic: From tactical technology to core business strategy. Technical report, Aberdeen Group Inc, Boston, Massachusetts, 2002. Rachel R Chen, Ganesh Janakiraman, Roundy Robin, and Rachel Q Zhang. Efficient auctions for supply chain procurement. Technical report, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 2002. A. Chavez and P. Maes. Kasbah: An agent marketplace for buying and selling goods. In First International Conference on the Practical Application of Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Technology (PAAM'96), pages 75-90, 1996. Gregory E Kersten, Sunil J Noronha, and Teich Jeffrey. Are all e-commerce negotiations auctions? In Fourth International Conference on the Design of Cooperative Systems, 2000. Noam Nisan. Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2000. W.E. Walsh, M.P. Wellman, and Fredrik Ygge. Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-00), pages 260-269, 2000. Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Computationally feasible vcg mechanisms. In Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2000. C H Papadimitriou. Algorithms, games and the internet. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2001. David C Parkes and Lyle H Ungar. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In Proceedings of the 17th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2000. D.C. Parkes. ibundle: An efficient ascending price bundle auction. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-99), pages 148-157, 2000. V Chvatal. A greedy heuristic for the set cover problem. Mathematics of Operations Research, 4:233-235, 1979. Tuomas W Sandholm and Subhash Suri. Side constraints and non price attributes in markets. In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2001. Hal R Varian. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995. Minor update, 2000. David Pisinger and Paolo Toth. Knapsack problems. In Du D.-Z and P M Pardolas, editors, Handbook of Combinatorial Optimization, pages 299-428. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. Dajun Zeng and Katia Sycara. Bayesian learning in negotiation. In Sandip Sen, editor, Working Notes for the AAAI Symposium on Adaptation, Co-evolution and Learning in Multiagent Systems, pages 99-104, Stanford University, CA, USA, 1996. Damian R Beil and Lawrence M Wein. An inverse optimization based auction mechanism to support a multi-attribute rfq process. Technical report, Operations Research Center, MIT, 2001. Martin Bichler and Jayant Kalagnanam. Winner determination problems in multi-attribute auctions. Technical report, IBM, 2002. Jeremie Gallien and Lawrence Wein. Design and analysis of a smart market for industrial procurement. Technical report, Operations Research Center, MIT, 2000. Vijay Krishna and Motty Perry. Efficient mechanism design. Technical report, Pennsylvania State University, http://econ.la.psu.edu/vkrishna/vcg18.ps, 1998. M. Wellman, W. Walsh, P. Wurman, and J. MacKie-Mason. Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. Technical report, 1998. A. Davenport and J. Kalagnanam. Price negotiations for direct procurement. Research Report RC 22078, IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NJ, USA, 2001. S. de Vries and R. V. Vohra. Combinatorial auctions: A survey. INFORMS Journal of Computing, 15(1), 2003. T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617-631, 1973. G. Hohner, J. Rich, E. Ng, G. Reid, A. J. Davenport, J. R. Kalagnam, H. S. Lee, and C. An. Combinatorial and quantity discount procurement auctions provide benifits to Mars and its suppliers. Research report, IBM Research, Yorktown Heights,NJ,USA, 2001. M. Eso, S. Ghosh, J. Kalagnanam, and L. Ladanyi. Bid evaluation in procurement auctions with piece-wise linear supply curves. Research Report RC 22219, IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NJ, USA, 2001. J. Kalagnanam and D. Parkes. Auctions, bidding, and exchange design. In Simchi-Levi, D. Wu, and Shen, editors, Supply Chain Analysis in the eBusiness Area. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25:699-738, 1987. P. Milogrom. Auctions and bidding: a primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3):3-22, 1989. Y. Narahari and Pankaj Dayama. Combinatorial auctions for electronic business. Technical report, Electronic Enterprises Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, July 2003. M. Pravin Kumar. Private e-marketplace for procurement: Architecture and algorithms. Technical Report M E Project Report, Dept. of Computer Science & Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India, 2001. T. Sandholm. An algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135(1):1-54, 2002. T. Sandholm and S. Suri. Bob: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artificial Intelligence, 145:33-58, 2003. J. Song and A. C. Regan. Combinatorial auctions for transportation procurement : The carrier perspective. Technical report, Institutee of Transportation Studies, University of California, Irvine, 2002. W. Vickrey. Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tender. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961. E. Wolfstetter. Auctions: An introduction. Economic Surveys, 10:367-421, 1996. E. Clarke. Multi-part pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17-23, 1971.

Intel Laboratory for Internet Technologies and E-Commerce Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science