Auctions

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Mutually destructive bidding: The fcc auction design problem. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2000. C. Cachin. Efficient private bidding and auctions with an oblivious third party. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, number 6, page To appear, 1999. C.G. Caplice. An optimization based bidding process: A new framework for shipper-carrier relationsships. Technical report, School of Engineering, MIT, 1996. K. Chui and R. Zwick. Auction on the internet - a preliminary study. Technical report, 1999. Scott H Clearwater (editor). Market based control: A paradigm for distributed resource allocation. World Scientific, 1996. D. Cliff and J. Bruten. Zero is not enough: On the lower limit of agent intelligence for continuous double auction markets. Technical report, HP, 1997. Peter C Cramton. The fcc spectrum auction: an early assessment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6(3):431-495, 1997. Peter Cramton and Jesse Schwartz. Collusive bidding: Lessons from the fcc spectrum auctions. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17, 2000. Jacques Cremer and McLean Richard. Optimal selling strategies under uncertainty for a discriminating monopolist when demands are interpendent. Econometrica, 53, 345. J.O. Kephart R. Das, J.E. Hanson and G. Tesauro. Agent-human interactions in the continous double auctions. 2001. A. Davenport and J. Kalagnanam. Price negotiations for direct procurement. Research Report RC 22078, IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NJ, USA, 2001. Azoulay-Schwartz R. David, E. and S. Kraus. An english auction protocol for multi-attribute items. 2002. R. Englebrecht-Wiggans and C. M. Kahn. Protecting the winner: Second price vs. ascending bid auctions. Economic Letters, 35:243-248, 1991. Jakka Sairamesh Donald F Ferguson, Christos Nikolaou and Yechiam Yemini. Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems. in clearwater. World Scientific, page 156. M. K. Franklin and M. K. Reiter. The design and implementation of a secure auction server. In IEEE Transaction on Software Engineering, volume 22, pages 302-312, 1998. D. Friedman. The double auction market institution: A survey. 1993. D. McAdams Y. Fujishima and Y. Shoham. Speeding up ascending-bid auctions. In Proceedings of International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-99), number 16, page 554, 1999. S. Gjerstad and J.Dickhaut. Price formation in double auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 22:1, 1998. J. D. Hartline A. V. Goldberg and A. Wright. Competitive auctions and digital goods. In Proceedings of ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, number 12, 2001. Robert L Graves, Linus Schrage, and Jayaram Sankaran. An auction method for course registration. In Interfaces, pages 23(5):81-92, 1993. Robert L Graves, Linus Schrage, and Jayaram Sankaran. Electronic auctions with private bids. In 3rd USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1998. Amy Greenwald and Justin Boyan. 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Sigeo Matsubara. Accelerating information revelation in ascending-bid auction - avoiding last minute bidding. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), page 29, 2001. R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 25:699, 1987. R. P. McAfee and J. McMillan. Analysing the airwaves auction. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1):159, 1996. S. J. Rassenti K. A. McCabe and V. L. Smith. Designing call auction institutions: Is double dutch the best? The Economic Journal, pages 9-23, 1992. P. Milgrom and R. J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50(5):1089, 1982. P. Milgrom and R. J. Weber. The value of information in a sealed-bid auctions. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10(1):105, 1982. P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending auction. P. Milgrom. Auctions and bidding: a primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3):3, 1989. P. Milgrom. Auction Theory for Privatization. Cambridge University Press, 1998. P. Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: The simltaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1999. Paul Milgrom. Putting auction theory to work: Asending auctions with package bidding. Technical report, Stanford and MIT, 2000. D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. K-price auctions (working paper). Technical report, 1998. D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. Internet auctions (working paper). Technical report, 1998. D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. Optimal auctions revisited. In Proceedings of National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-98), number 15, page 32, 1998. Rudolf Muller. Auctions-the big winner among trading mechanisms for the internet economy. Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. pages 50:1089-1122, 1982. Amir Ronen. On approximating optimal auctions. In Proceedings of ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), page 11, 2001. A. E. Roth and A. Ockenfels. Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions: theory and evidence from a natural experiment on the internet (working paper). Technical report, 2000. T. Teisberg M. Rothkopf and E. Kahn. Why are vickrey auctions rare? Journal of Political Economy, 98:94-109, 1990. T. W. Sandholm. Limitation of the vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems. In Proceedings of International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (ICMAS-96), number 2, page 299, 1996. Toumas W Sandholm. Issues in computational vickrey auctions. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 4:107-129, 2000. Mark Stegeman. Participation costs and efficient auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 71:228-259, 1996. J. Teich, H. Wallenius, J. Wallenius, and A. Zaitsev. A multiple unit auction algorithm: Some theory and a web implementation electronic markets. International Journal of Electronic Commerce and Business Media, 9(3):1-7, 1999. William S. Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 16:8-37, 1961. P. Wurman W. Walsh, M. Wellman and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. In Proceedings of International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, number 18, 1998. M. P. Wellman. A market-oriented programming environment and its application to distributed multicomodity flow problems. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 1:1, 1993. Michael P Wellman. Market-oriented programming: Some early lessons. pages 74-95, 1996. M.  Wellman and P.  Wurman Real time issues for Internet auctions, number 1, 1998. Wellman. M.P., Walsh. W. E., Wurman. P.R and MacKie-Mason. J. K Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling, number 18, 1998. P. R. Wurman M. P. Wellman, W. E. Walsh and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. Games and Econimic Behavior, 35(1):271, 2001. E. Wolfstetter. Auctions: An introduction. Economic Surveys, 10:367-421, 1996. P.R. Wurman, M.P. Wellman, and W.E. Walsh. The michigan auction bot: A configurable auction server for human software agents. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents, AGENTS-98, number 2, 1998. Michael P Wellman Peter R Wurman and William E Walsh. A parameterization of the auction design space.Games and Economic Behavior, 35:304-338, 2001.

Intel Laboratory for Internet Technologies and E-Commerce Department of Computer Science and Automation Indian Institute of Science